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In analysing the evolution of the police model in Spain during the country’s 
shift from dictatorship to democracy, the approach employed in this working 
paper is grounded on the premise that police knowledge is conditioned by their 
professional culture; in other words, by the image the security forces themselves 
have of the functions they fulfil, and by the cultural environment which is made 
up of the perceptions they have of the external reality.1 In this respect, one 
would expect to find tangible differences between democratic and non- 
democratic systems2 in relation to the formation of police knowledge. In the 
latter case, the functions carried out by the police are of an explicitly political 
character. Their main objective is the surveillance of social groups which could 
represent a threat to the survival of the regime. The state does not seek to 
institutionalize or integrate those groups which challenge, to a greater or lesser 
degree, the established power, but simply to eliminate them or at least to control 
them. The police model in this case is, to a large extent, comparable with the 
ideal model of the Staatspolizei,3 characterized by a mentality wholly concerned 
with the maintenance of ’law and order’ and the supreme interests of the state. 
Any unrest or criticism, no matter how moderate, is perceived as a threat against 
the very foundations of the state and is thus met with a disproportionately harsh 
response. Demonstrations are regarded with suspicion and distrust because they 
disrupt harmonious relations between the state and society. In short, the police 
force in a non-democratic state is specifically moulded by the state to defend its 
own interests and rulers. On the other hand, tolerant political systems, 
characterized by a broadening of participation and depending to a greater extent 
on public cooperation, tend to facilitate the development of a Biirgerpolizer, 
namely, a force which is closer to the citizen, whose primary objective is not to
1 Donatella della Porta proposes this model in Police Knowledge and Public Order, a 
research proposal (draft), European University Institute, June 1993.
2 We accept the ideas of authoritarianism and democratic systems proposed by Seymour 
Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics o f Unreason. Right Wing Extremism in America 
1790-1977, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978 and Guillermo O’Donnell and 
Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Tentative Conclusions about 
Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, Chapters 2 and 3.
3 A precise description of the characteristics of the main ideal police models is given 



























































































The policing of Social Protest in Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy
protect the state’s interests but rather to defend the basic rules which ensure the 
existence of democratic society.4
This working paper focuses upon the evolution of a police model - the 
shift from a model characterized by its principal task of defending the interests 
of an authoritarian state controlled by a narrow range of elites towards one 
which is at the service of a significantly broader range of political elites 
dependent on a greater number of interests (polyarchy).5 We shall look at how 
police knowledge has evolved within those units of the security forces which 
represent the state’s last resort for the imposition of public order. For certain 
social groups these units embody the true face of the state’s structural violence 
in its purest form. In many cases, the citizen’s image of state action is 
determined by contact (head-on confrontation) with these police units. In social 
protests these units represent the naked oppressive power of the ’system’. For 
this reason it is vitally important to understand how this part of the state - 
apparently differentiated from the rest - views the citizenry and tries to live up 
to its expectations. Likewise, we shall focus our attention on the evolution of 
police perception within a framework of the continual interaction which takes 
place between the security forces - let us not forget that they too are composed 
of citizens - and the citizenry at a critical time; that is, the profound political 
transformations in Spain during the transition period (1977-1982) and the 
subsequent democratic consolidation.
A Historical Note on the Evolution of the Police
In the evolution of police responses to social protest from the time of Franco’s 
victory in the Civil War (1936-1939) until the present day, it is possible to 
distinguish four different stages. The first period, from the end of the war in 
1939 until 1960, was, socially, a very peaceful time, with no significant 
disturbances. The second period, from 1960 until Franco’s death in 1975, was 
marked by a weakening of the regime’s iron grip on society as a result of the 
emergence of significant social groups which began to openly dissent from the
4 The distinction between ’Staats-' and ' Burgerpolizei' does not automatically 
correspond to the functions assigned to the police in a repressive state and a tolerant one, 
respectively. Rather, it corresponds to the degree of openness of the political elites in relation 
to new politico-social demands and the institutionalization of excluded political elites.






























































































political principles on which the regime was based. The intensity of protest 
increased until the breakdown of the regime, which occurred formally in 1976. 
A dynamic of progressive political change, interwined with residual elements of 
the former regime, began in the following period. Uncertainty about the 
immediate future characterized this period, and there is no doubt that it not only 
conditioned police perceptions of the external environment but also their actions 
in various fields. This period of democratic transition ended in 1982 with the 
victory of the Socialist Party at the general elections, from which moment we 
may consider democracy to have become consolidated. Thus began a period of 
progressive accommodation of the security forces to the new socio-political 
reality. Any threat of regression had been practically eliminated.
With the end of the Civil War, a new political regime emerged, 
characterized by the authoritarian and personal power of General Franco. The 
most reactionary sectors of Spanish society had contributed to Franco’s victory 
and subsequently enjoyed a privileged relationship with the new regime, 
although bitter confrontations which were difficult to conceal divided the 
different elites. During the first years of the regime, close ties were maintained 
with fascist countries. However, the end of the World War and the consequent 
defeat of the fascist regimes brought a distinct cooling in relations. Within 
Spain, the regime displayed a marked hostility toward any kind of political 
dissent. This animosity logically translated into the development of security 
forces whose main concern was to combat threats to the regime.6 Post-war 
repression was severe and, in many cases, indiscriminate. Between 1939 and 
1944, nearly 200,000 members of the political opposition were executed, and in 
1940 more than 250,000 people were held in prison (8 per cent of the working 
population) for political reasons.7 The political opposition initially chose to fight 
the regime by means of guerrilla warfare; a strategy which was, however, 
successfully and pitilessly defeated by the state security forces. With the
6 The nature of the Francoist period has been analysed by Juan José Linz, ’Una teoria 
del régimen autoritario. El caso de Espana’, pp. 1467-1531 in Manuel Fraga, Juan Velarde 
and Salustiano del Campo (eds.), La Espana de los anos setenta, voi. 3; El Estado y  la 
politica, Madrid: Moneda y Crédito, 1974.
7 Figures provided by Stanley Payne, Falange: Story o f Spanish Fascism, Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1961, quoted by Francisco Sànchez, ’Conflictos 
laborales en Madrid durante la dictadura y la democracia’, pp. 169-214 in Molestar cultural 
y  conflicto en la sociedad madrilena, Madrid: Colección Documentos, Comunidad Autònoma 
de Madrid, Consejeria de Integración Social, 1991. The data on the number of prisoners are 




























































































The policing of Social Protest in Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy
realization that this strategy was a costly mistake (4,500 guerrilla fighters had 
been killed without having achieved anything), the opposition developed a new 
set of tactics at the beginning of the 1950s which was based on political activity 
in the workplace. During this period, the population was either too afraid or too 
passive to initiate a revolt. In fact, broad sectors of Spanish society were 
satisfied with the principles of the regime. Until the end of the 1950s the 
dictatorship did not experience any real threat, either from the weak internal 
opposition forces or from external actors.
Historically, the first national police system was the Guardia Civil (the 
Spanish Civil Guard), created in 1844 by an army officer. Its structure was 
militarized due to the army’s powerful influence. Following the Civil War, the 
Guardia Civil underwent profound changes, becoming an even more radically 
militarized force as a result of the role assigned to it; namely, that of a static 
surveillance agency with the maintenance of public order as its first and 
principal function. This paramilitary force took a very active part in the fight 
against the political opposition. Gradually, however, the importance of the 
Guardia Civil declined in the fight against the political opposition. The golden 
days of the struggle against the communists and anarchist guerrilla maquls 
belonged to the past. With increasing urbanization, the importance of the rural 
areas diminished in favour of the cities where the growing population became 
a potential source of political and social unrest. Thus, the role of the new urban 
police force rapidly grew in significance.
After Franco’s victory, the civilian police system and structure were 
radically changed. At the beginning of the 1940s, the republican Guardia de 
Asalto was renamed the Policia Armada, and more and more personnel were 
employed and resources spent in response to a presumed latent social unrest and 
the fear of leftist activism. Public order in large cities was so important to the 
dictatorial regime that in 1959 the armed traffic police was dismantled in order 
to increase the number of policemen deployed on the streets. Having become 
part of the armed forces, it too, like the Guardia Civil, had a militarized 
structure. This new force was largely made up war veterans, who were aware 
of its repressive political function and who developed a deeply authoritarian 
organizational culture.
Franco’s repressive system was highly effective during the first decades. 
After the war and during most of the 1950s, social protest was almost non­
existent. Neither the Policia Armada nor the Guardia Civil were used to 





























































































forbidden and heavily punished. In a situation of potential unrest, the usual 
procedure was for the Guardia Civil to send a pareja (pair) of Civil Guards to 
the site; if the unrest had already abated, the mere presence of the pair of men 
should have been enough to deter any further action. If this did not suffice, the 
pareja could always use their regulation weapons to reestablish public order. 
This was the normal procedure during those years and was, in fact, highly 
effective.8
During the 1950s, the working class began to organize itself in order to 
defend basic social and economic rights, though this proved to be very difficult 
due to the initially low level of organization. The former trade unions and 
political parties had been dismantled and the regime’s control over the official 
trade unions was strong. There was no real need for the government to develop 
sophisticated means of control of public order during these years; the whole 
decade was extremely peaceful. The regime no longer felt threatened by the 
international community as Franco believed that he was a necessary arm in the 
Western fight against the communist world; moreover, the internal communist 
threat was not strong enough to present a real problem.
The 1960s marked the beginning of a very important period of economic 
development which, however, did not favour so much the emergence of a 
political consciousness as an individualistic desire for economic improvement. 
It was only from the 1960s on, when the impact of the Civil War and the post­
war period had been partly surmounted and new generations who had not 
experienced the war were appearing in the political arena, that the regime’s 
overwhelming control was really defied, with a serious attempt to undermine the 
old values and the power of the political elites. Real problems for the regime in 
terms of public order started as the 1960s opened. At the end of the previous 
decade, the workers’ organizations, well-organized and led by efficient and 
experienced communist leaders, rocked the apparent peacefulness of the regime. 
Moreover, large numbers of students began to voice their disaffection with the 
lack of public freedom and the absence of freedom of speech.9 This sudden 
source of unrest had not been foreseen by the government.
8 This procedure has been described by Manuel Martin Fernandez, La profesion de 
policia, Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas, 1990, p. 75.
9 On the resurgence of the democratic opposition in Spain, see Jose Maria Maravall, 





























































































The policing of Social Protest in Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy
In order to defend the continuity of the political system, the regime’s 
repressive strategies and tactics had to be adapted to the new situation. Several 
important measures were thus introduced. In 1959, the Public Order Law, which 
detailed the procedures to be employed in confronting public demonstrations, 
was passed. This law remained in force until 1992. Second, some specific units 
of the Policia Armada received training in anti-riot tactics in urban areas. 
Franco’s dictatorship was aware that Spanish society was changing very rapidly 
and that the opposition was developing new strategies to fight against the 
regime. In order to meet the new public order challenges more efficiently, the 
Compahias de Reserva General (General Reserve Companies) were created in 
1969 as specific anti-riot force units. They were based throughout the national 
territory, concentrating however on the most critical urban areas. The values, 
discipline and structure as well as the administration of this new force were a 
copy of those of the army. Despite the use of the new units and anti-riot 
equipment, the number of deaths caused by the police at demonstrations 
remained very high. The reason for the deaths was sometimes the inappropriate 
use of the new equipment and sometimes simply the brutality waged against 
demonstrators during the suppression of unrest. Third, aware of the advancing 
age of police officers, the government developed a recruitment programme 
aimed at young people for the Policia Armada. A further measure was the 
establishment in 1964 of the TOP (Public Order Court), a special court to deal 
with issues relating to public order offences. A few years later, this court would 
demonstrate its full capacity when thousands of people appeared before it. Fifth, 
the articles of the Penal Code relating to social and political offences were 
modified to increase the severity of punishments. Sixth, the Guardia Civil 
received anti-riot equipment, although this only came about after the Policia 
Armada had already been so equipped as the use of such measures was 
considered less important in the rural areas. Finally, the well-developed 
information service network of the Guardia Civil was increasingly focused on 
detecting political opposition organizations and, more specifically, their leaders.
The main preoccupation of the Spanish police forces during the 1960s was 
the fight against growing social unrest. Serious public order problems began for 
the police in 1962, when the workers’ groups started to display a high level of 
activism and organization. As a consequence, the Policia Armada increased its 
members rapidly. During the last years of the regime it was the main force used 
to deal with social protests on the streets of the industrialized urban areas. These 
riots were one of the prime concerns of the dying regime during the 1970s, 





























































































middle of the decade - a doubling of the ranks from 30,000 to 60,000 occurred 
over a short period of time. Attitudes within the hard-core regime elite demons­
trated that powerful sectors, such as the falangists and the army, were not ready 
to allow a peaceful political transition.10 1Some public statements issued by 
high-ranking army officers encouraged the elite’s most conservative sectors to 
resist and the police to exercise tough control over the political opposition."
As we will see, some changes in the behaviour of the security forces did 
begin to slowly take place from 1976 on, during the period of political 
transition. The police forces withdrew from the universities and intervened less 
frequently in labour conflicts.12 There is no evidence that this change of 
attitude was ever the result of tacit agreements between the police force and 
demonstrators, as occurred in some other countries.13 Moreover, despite the few 
changes introduced, the anti-riot units continued to respond to breaches of public 
order in almost exactly the same way: between 1975 and 1979, the police caused 
the death of 36 people in street confrontations.14 In 1978 the new democratic 
Constitution was approved. The concept of public order as an issue relating to 
the internal security structure was almost absent from the text, but there was still 
a confusion between the concepts of public order and seguridad ciudadana 
(public safety). The constitutional text allowed for a broad interpretation by the 
different political forces.
10 For an excellent study of the Spanish extreme right during this period, written from 
a historical perspective, see José Luis Rodriguez, Reaccionarios y  Golpistas. La extrema 
derecha en Espana: del tardofranquismo a la consolidaciôn de la democracia (1967-1982), 
Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1994.
11 In 1974, Lieutenant-General Garcia Rebull declared to the press that ’As a falangist, 
I do not accept any kind of associations. Associations are a dangerous evil for the whole of 
society.’ Quoted in Manuel Ballbé, Orden publico y  militarismo en la Espana constitucional 
(1812-1983), Madrid: Alianza, 1983, p. 452.
12 Ibid., p. 455.
13 During the political tumult at the end of the 1980s in Hungary, the existence of such 
a tacit agreement was perceived, no doubt fostered by uncertainty regarding the immediate 
future. See Maté Szabô, ’Policing Mass Demonstrations in Hungary’, paper presented at the 
conference, "The Policing of Mass Demonstrations in Contemporary Democracies", 13-14 
October 1995, EUI, Florence.




























































































The policing of Social Protest in Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy
In the 1980s, and especially after the socialist victory, the anti-riot forces 
became less harsh in their actions and demonstrations began to be conducted in 
a more moderate manner. Workers’ demonstrations were less influenced by the 
largest socialist trade union which tried by every means to decrease pressure on 
the new socialist government. Furthermore, the student movement almost 
completely disappeared. In response to this new public order situation, which 
was closer to that of the Western democracies than to the former dictatorial and 
post-Franco period, the structure of the anti-riot forces changed. Deployment of 
these forces had been a response to a critical political and social situation which 
no longer obtained. In addition, it was increasingly clear that the average age 
of this specialized police force was too high for them to perform their functions 
properly (policemen were assigned to these special units and remained there for 
the rest of their professional lives). Thus, in 1989, new units, known as the 
Unidades de Intervention Policial (Police Riot Squads), were formally created.
Factors Conditioning the Evolution of the Police during the Transition
The model of political transition seized upon in Spain and the way it unfolded 
in different phases are issues which remain subject to diverse interpretations. 
Debate has turned upon the specific character of the Spanish transition; that is, 
whether this meant a radical break with the past or a reform of the essential 
structures of the previous regime in order to adapt them to a new socio-political 
context. With regard to the phases during which the transition occurred, we shall 
opt for an operative approach to the data, highlighting the political rather than 
the institutional aspect. In the following, we take July 1976, when the King 
dismissed the last Prime Minister of the Franco regime, Arias Navarro, as the 
starting-point of the transition; and we consider it to have concluded in October 
1982, when for the first time a change of government was brought about by 
electoral means with the victory of PSOE (Spanish Workers’ Socialist Party).
The dictator’s death in 1975 ushered in a period of intense political and 
social uncertainty. In 1976, a process of political change was set in motion. 
Various factors contributed to this, particularly the consensus achieved between 
the different political sensibilities - those surviving the decay of the old regime 
and those of the opposition. While this consensus gave rise to a stronger 
tendency towards change, at the same time it limited more resolute and profound 
progress in some areas.15 Other contributing factors were the influence of a 
public opinion in favour of moderate political change, and the positive influence





























































































of other democratic countries.16 The new situation which emerged after the fall 
of the Franco regime was the result of the rehabilitation of the old structures to 
bring them in line with the new political necessities. The most important.! 
opposition parties implicitly accepted the new situation, subjecting themselves 
to a set of ground rules despite the fact that they had not participated in their 
formulation. Subsequently, the apparent stalemate - the opposition forces were 
unable to provoke radical political change and the political establishment was no 
longer able to keep broad sectors of Spanish society under control- led the most 
moderate political sectors of the former regime to negotiate with the most 
significant opposition parties in order to give shape to a new political regime for 
the post-Franco era. Progressively, the transition took the form of an ’agreed 
rupture’, which meant that the political rules changed radically, political parties 
and trade unions were legalized and a Parliament was established which could 
foster a standard Western democracy. On the other hand, a king was still on the 
throne and the state administrative structures remained practically untouched. 
The civil servants, imbued with the ways of the former regime, remained and 
established the basis of the new regime. The army endured as a sacred 
untouched island, impervious to the new way of thinking. So too with the old 
security structures and agencies - the judges and policemen who had harassed 
the opposition movement for many decades - remained at their posts. At the 
beginning of the political process of transition, police behaviour barely changed 
at all. The same people were using the same repressive methods, as before. |
A. Factors which Slowed Down the Pace of Change
The ’agreed rupture’ of the Franco regime meant that state structures would 
hardly be affected by changes which were approaching as a result of agreements 
between the different political sectors. The state bureaucracy remained 
practically unchanged and, even during the transition period, former members 
of the vertical unions and the traditional fascist organization, Movimiento 
Nacional (an evolved form of the earlier Falange Espahola y  de las JONS),
16 See, Jose Felix Tezanos, Ramón Cotarelo and Andrés de Bias (eds.), La transition 
democràtica espanola, Madrid: Sistema, 1989; Ramón Cotarelo, La transition espafiola, 
Madrid: Editorial, 1989; and Ramón Cotarelo (comp.), Transition politica y  consolidation 




























































































The policing of Social Protest in Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy
were incorporated into the civil service.17 Likewise, the elites of the Franco 
regime continued to play an important role in the political decision-making of 
the state. Their presence, legitimized by their new affiliations to parties of the 
right and centre and by their royal appointment as senators, thus conditioned the 
evolution of the new regime.18 During the period of political change, highly- 
placed politicians in the Ministry of the Interior were constantly overreached by 
formerly influential politicians of the previous regime.
The army had been one of the props of the former regime, which 
therefore made it credible for a large part of the most reactionary sector to 
shelter within it. Though difficult to quantify, this sector indubitably wielded a 
very real power and was clearly dissatisfied with the initiation of a process of 
openness. The army was the power that most patently showed its hostility 
towards the democratic process; indeed, military authorities inhibited the 
government on many occasions with their attitude of open challenge towards the 
civil powers.19 Rumours of a military coup d’etat constantly circulated during 
the first years of the transition, leading up to an actual attempt in February 1981. 
Its eventual failure was largely due to the lack of real objectives and 
coordination within the rebel forces, and because of the widespread loyalty 
maintained by the military authorities towards the crown as the only prevailing 
institution legitimized by Franco’s regime.
The security forces created during Franco’s regime were composed of a 
dense network of loyal officials whose main task was to ensure the perpetuation 
of the existing political system. The police were modelled on a military ethos,
17 See Jose Felix Tezanos, ’La Crisis del Franquismo y la Transición democràtica en 
Espana’, p. 9-30, in Jose Felix Tezanos, Ramon Cotarelo and Andrés de Bias (eds.), La 
Transición Democratica Espahola, Madrid: Editorial Sistema, 1989.
18 In this sense, it is wortli remembering that in 1979 19.96 per cent of the members of 
parliament came from the elite of the Franco regime. UCD members (centre-right) belonging 
to this elite accounted for 22.89 per cent, while for AP (Conservative) the figure rose to 81.85 
per cent. Similarly, 70.73 per cent of the senators directly appointed by the king had been 
members of Franco’s elite. Against this background, ’It is clear that the continuity in respect 
of the former regime has been propitiated by the person whom we must consider to be the 
engine of change’. See Mariano Baena del Alcazar and Jose Maria Garcia Madaria, ’Elite 
franquista y burocracia en las Cortes actuales’, Sistema, n. 28 (1979), pp. 3-50.
19 In relation to the attitude of the civil powers towards the army officers, see Paul 





























































































according to which the maintenance of public order prevailed over other police 
functions. Indeed, the management of the police forces had been specifically 
assigned to military personnel. During the first years of the transition, police 
officers who had taken part in the harsh political repression of the opposition 
remained in their posts. Even those officials who had committed obvious abuses 
during the course of their work, such as police chiefs suspected of having 
participated in plots to destabilize the new regime, kept their positions.20 Nor 
were significant changes introduced during the first years of the transition in 
terms of the methods employed to suppress demonstrations; things continued by 
inertia from the last period of the previous regime.21
The information services had played a very important role during Franco’s 
time in the detection of opposition groups, and they were not able to completely 
cast off this function during the transition years. Likewise, they collaborated at 
different levels with groups of extreme right-wing foreigners that had been 
allowed to establish themselves in Spain, supposedly as a reward for certain 
’dirty services’ carried out by them for the Spanish security forces during the 
transition years (the ’dirty’ war against ETA, actions against left-wing 
groups).22 Some groups even began to collaborate with the security forces from 
1975, after Franco’s death.23 Furthermore, a certain passivity could be perceived 
on the part of the security forces in the investigation of crimes perpetrated by
20 Some commentators consider it feasible that members of the state security services 
were involved in certain terrorist actions which were carried out at crucial times during the 
transition period against high-profile individuals. See Fernando Reinares, ’Sociogenesis y 
evolucion del terrorismo en Espana’, pp. 353-396 in Salvador Giner (ed.), Espafia: sociedad 
y  politica, Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1990.
21 As Rodolfo Martin Villa, Minister of the Interior from 1976 to 1979, later 
acknowledged, reform of the security forces did not begin until 1979 because of fears of a 
possible rebellion. See Rodolfo Martin Villa, Al servicio del Estado, Barcelona: Planeta, 1984, 
pp. 150-158.
22 As the Florentine judge, Pier Luigi Vigna, affirms, ’The Spanish secret services used 
radical and violent exponents of the Italian groups in the extremist provocations of the first 
years of the transition.’ See Mariano Sanchez Soler, Los Hijos del 20-N. Historia violenla del 
fascismo espanol. Madrid: Ediciones Temas de Hoy, 1993, p. 167.
23 In this regard see L.F. Rodriguez-Granero, ’Las tramas anti-ETA. La mas sucia de las 




























































































The policing of Social Protest in Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy
extreme right-wing groups24, while actions of the extreme left wing were 
answered immediately and forcefully. This state of affairs began to change from 
February 1983 as a result of the imprisonment of certain Italian, French and 
Spanish ultra-right wingers involved in international terrorist attacks.25 Finally, 
some socially imperceptible changes began to take place from the beginning of 
the 1980s when the government sought to keep under control and to discipline 
the police units in charge of surveillance and investigation of ultra-right 
gangs.26
B. Factors which Favoured Change
The progressive transformation of society was not only confined to its habits and 
customs, but also profoundly affected the political perception of the regime. The 
new socio-political situation, together with the generational change, favoured the 
emergence of a new society, one that was profoundly different to that which had 
existed 20 years earlier. During the final years of the Franco regime, a moderate 
political attitude on the part of the public could already be perceived and this 
was clearly at odds with the principles of the regime.27 This was to be a 
decisive factor, one which undoubtedly contributed to smoothing the way for the 
transition and to avoiding serious social convulsions.28
24 Between December 1975 and June 1976, for instance, more than 50 attacks were 
carried out by the extreme right, though the police did not make a single arrest. El Pais, 20 
July 1976, p. 6.
25 See Mariano Sanchez Soler, op. cit., p. 202.
26 See Fernando Reinares, op. cit., p. 389.
27 In this regard see R. Lopez Pintor and R. Buceta, Los Espanoles de los alios setenta: 
Una version sociològica. Madrid: Tecnos, 1975.
28 In fact, significant social convulsions did not take place either in favour of or against 
the change of regime. According to some authors (e.g. Rafael Lopez Pintor and R. Buceta, 
op. cit ), anomie, a subject’s attitude when faced with an environment which he is powerless 
to influence, prevailed among the Spanish population. Subsequently, during the transition, the 
public’s passivity favoured the premeditated strategy of political ’normalization’ practised by 
the elites. See Jorge Benedicto Millàn, ’Sistemas de valores y pautas de cultura politica 
predominantes en la sociedad espanola (1976-1985)’, pp. 645-678, in Jose Felix Tezanos, 
Ramón Cotarelo and Andrés de Bias, La transición democratica espanola. Madrid; Sistema, 






























































































The political parties had remained underground since the end of the Civil 
War. Throughout the following decades, their presence was very weak and their 
position precarious in Spain. With the end of the dictatorship and the subsequent 
appointment of Adolfo Suarez as Prime Minister, a slow process of political 
accommodation began, involving the opposition parties which had been most 
active in the struggle against the Franco regime. Among these, the Communist 
Party stood out as being the largest and best-organized political force of the 
time. Nevertheless, other minor political forces which would later achieve 
considerable importance as well as figures from the former regime known for 
their liberal and democratic tendencies joined in this process. In this way, a 
series of solid links was sought, with the aim of developing implicit agreements 
between the different political sensibilities. It was intended that these links 
would create a propitious climate to facilitate the process of moving on from 
that politically critical phase. After the general elections of 1977, the main 
political forces signed an agreement establishing the conditions for a set of 
immediate political, economic and social rules which would help solve the deep- 
seated political and economic problems besetting the country. This agreement, 
known as the Pactos de la Moncloa (The Moncloa Agreements), set down some 
vague foundations for a reform of the police forces, which however lacked far- 
reaching goals. Indeed, the primary and immediate objective of the political 
opposition was to weed out those members of the police forces who had played 
a direct role in the political repression. With only some ’minor’ structural 
changes, almost the entire structure and personnel remained. Only a few officials 
who had been involved in suppressive actions against the political opposition 
were actually dismissed.
The new police legislation was to a large extent the result of agreements 
between different political sensibilities. However, the military sector and, most 
significantly, conservative members of Parliament strongly influenced these 
different political sensibilities, thereby acting as a decisive factor in holding back 
and postponing a restructuring of the police forces. Changes were effected 
slowly and without great conviction since no target model of what a police force 
should be had been defined. In the new legislation, innovative elements showing 
a willingness to change were combined with others that merely served to 
perpetuate the militarized nature of the police force. This resulted in the drafting 




























































































The policing of Social Protest in Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy
The Police Law, passed in 1978, was the immediate outcome of the 
Moncloa Agreements.29 While the influence of the army on the police structure 
decreased, it nonetheless remained very important. Prior to this basic reform, 
most of the officers of the Policia Armada came from the army. These military 
officers stayed on as members of the armed forces and received only brief trai­
ning. After the 1978 law, most of the new officers came from a specific police 
academy; only a few military officers selected by the Ministry of the Interior 
could have access to the police structure, though training continued to be largely 
military-based and was given by army personnel. The most immediate signifi­
cant change with the new law was that military courts no longer dealt with cases 
relating to citizens’ free expression and the police forces ceased to be protected 
by military legislation. In 1986, new police legislation, the Ley Organica de 
Fuerzas y  Cuerpos de Seguridad del Estado (State Police Law), was approved. 
Finally, thanks to this law, the non-paramilitary police forces rationalized their 
organization. But one of the most important outcomes of this new law was that 
the Cuerpo Nacional de Policia (CNP) became a fully civil corps, abandoning 
its military status.30 A few years later, in 1992, the Public Order Law of 1959 
was abolished and replaced by the Ley de Proteccion de la Seguridad Ciudadana 
(Protection of Public Safety Law).
Finally, even before the death of the dictator there was a move towards 
the development of a more open, pluralistic kind of press. Various periodicals 
began to be published in Spain which attempted as far as possible to be free of 
the influences and conditioning imposed by the regime. In part, this was made 
possible with the Press Law of 1967 which, by imposing self-censorship, made 
each publication responsible for its own content. The democratic press had 
backed a smooth change of regime and already possessed a certain degree of 
savoir faire. During the last years of the regime, and especially during the first 
years following Franco’s death and the initial years of the transition, the press 
helped to bring to the public’s attention issues which were delicate and sensitive 
for the governments of the time, particularly issues concerned internal security
29 The real effects of this law have been discussed by Manuel Ballbe, op. cit., p. 471 ff.; 
Diego Lopez Garrido, El aparato policial en Espana, Barcelona: Ariel, 1987, p. 14 and Ian 
R., Macdonald, ’The Police System of Spain’, pp. 224 ff. in John Roach and Jurgen Thoma- 
neck (eds.), Police and Public Order in Europe, London: Croom Helm, 1985.
30 The Cuerpo Nacional de Policia continued to have a partially military nature even 
until 1985, since one in three posts in the police administration from the highest levels down 





























































































and terrorism. To the already existing publications, others were added, emerging 
now in a new political context devoid of authoritarianism.31 The press reported 
the excesses of the security forces and any actions or attitudes on the part of the 
administration or nostalgic groups which recalled past times. Likewise, the press 
played an important role in helping public opinion adapt to the new political 
situation, assuming to a large extent the functions of political interpreter and 
educator.
C. Interaction of the Different Factors
Given the interplay of these various factors, it follows that there existed 
powerful forces which ensured that the future model of the police force would 
be shaped during the years of transition and democratic consolidation. This 
model was formed within an ongoing interaction of forces, which favoured a 
dialectic between continuity and innovation. Unity within those forces which 
were hindering change broke down with the slow decomposition of the elites of 
the old regime during the years leading up to the death of General Franco. As 
a consequence, the conservative nuclei appeared as an uncoordinated front with 
very limited credibility as a political alternative. Each sector had different aims 
and plans (political sectors), and some did not even have viable projects of any 
specific nature (military sectors). They were merely trying not to lose the power 
they had enjoyed up until then. Nor, however, were the opposition groups 
unified and coordinated. Each shade of political sensibility sought to ensure that 
its point of view held sway over the rest. Nonetheless, a positive attitude 
prevailed as regards the development of a new political regime. The political 
organizations and those powers that had backed the process of change, as well 
as the greater part of the public, pushed together towards a political 
transformation without too much tumult.
31 For more information about the role played by the press during the transition period, 
see J. Giner, ’Journalists, Mass Media and Public Opinion in Spain, 1938-1982’, in Kenneth 
Maxwell (ed.), The Press and the Rebirth o f the Iberian Democracy. Westport; Greenwood 
Press, 1983. See also, Antonio Sanchez-Gijon, ’The Spanish Press in the Transition Period’, 




























































































The policing of Social Protest in Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy
The Evolution of Police Knowledge during the Transition and Democratic 
Consolidation32
In this section we shall analyse the evolution that has taken place in police 
perceptions of the outside world. We shall also compare the self-image of the 
present-day police forces as they carry out the functions with which they have 
been entrusted and that of former units charged with the maintenance of public 
order during the transition period.33
A. Perceptions of the Past
Most of the members of the riot squads are young people who took up their 
posts in the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, one of the purposes of the 1989 reform 
was to enable a renewal of staff so that it would be better suited to the objective 
necessities of the functions that personnel must carry out. The structure of the 
Brigadas de Reserva was hampered by a series of basic limitations,34 which 
severely impaired their abilities when faced with immediate necessities. The 
generally young medium-ranking policemen and chiefs (group and unit chiefs) 
belong to generations which were socialized within a socio-political context 
postdating the dictatorship. Some of the high-ranking chiefs, on the other hand, 
did serve in those units during the 1970s, although they remain a minority since 
the 1989 reform affected all levels of the unit’s organization.
Nonetheless, there is consensus among the officers of the riot squads, 
regardless of when they joined, that significant changes have taken place, not so 
much in police mentality as in the socio-political and legal environment. They 
recognize that this has to a great extent determined the character and form of
32 I would like to thank the Area de Prospectiva del Gabinete de Estudios y  Prospectiva 
de la Secretaria de Estado de Interior as well as the Jefatura Central de las Unidades de 
Intervencion Policial, for their help with this part of my research.
33 This analysis is based on in-depth interviews using semi-structured questionnaires and 
conducted among high- and medium-ranking officers o f the Unidades de Intervencion Policial 
of the Cuerpo Nacional de Policta. The interviews were carried out between 15 March and 
19 December 1995.
34 There was no age limit for service, policemen had to live in barracks, and there were 





























































































their behaviour. These changes are perceived very clearly, as commented upon 
by a medium-ranking officer:
There was anxiety among the citizens ... During the previous years large gatherings 
were not possible, there was a bit of rowdiness, but not now. Everything is much 
calmer, more controlled on their part, more experience on ours. We anticipate events. 
Anyway, there is much greater freedom, now much more is allowed than before. Now, 
in Madrid there are collectives that can block a road like the M-40, they authorize it 
and everything’s all right. A few years ago that was unthinkable (...). It’s also true that 
it was much easier for the police, orders were much clearer: It’s prohibited and we’re 
going to break it up (...). Before it was more violent, but I don’t think it was more 
difficult. It was a different method. (Interview No. 6)
This opinion expresses a widely-held feeling; although most of the 
interviewees did not experience the earlier period first hand, they consider that 
there is a considerable difference between that socio-political time and today. 
The public’s attitude during those years is not criticized, but a link is constantly 
made with the present. The intolerance of those days is contrasted with the 
permissive character of today’s society. Most of the interviewees regard the 
turbulent 1970s at arm’s length, and not without a certain relief that those times 
now belong to a relatively distant past in people’s minds as well as in years, 
even though in some respects they are still present. The nostalgia betrayed in 
certain interviews by Italian police for the time when the actors had 
’comprehensible’ end-goals35 has not yet appeared in Spain, due fundamentally 
to the fact that the past decades, characterized by a high level of confrontation 
and manifest hostility on the part of many sectors of the public, are still very 
present in the inherited collective consciousness of these units.
Notable differences are also perceived between the 1980s and the present 
day, as may be seen in the following remarks:
[In comparison with the 1980s, control of public disorder today] is easier, above all 
because of the great experience we now have, and it’s also true that the level of 
aggressive confrontation has diminished. There are more demonstrations, more public 
shows, but there is less violence. It’s easier to control it, and there are clearer 
delimitations about what people can do within the bounds of legality. Now everybody 
knows the rules that apply (...). We have acquired experience and so have the citizens. 
(Interview No. 5)




























































































The policing of Social Protest in Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy
In comparison with the 1980s, the present decade displays notably less 
aggressive confrontation in society. The fact that the actions of these units are, 
from a legal point of view, more restricted means that officials are freed from 
the obligation of taking decisions, thereby diminishing the likelihood of 
mistakes. Legislation on public order dating from 1959 remained in force until 
1992, which meant that legal texts had not been adapted to the new socio­
political circumstances. This was clearly perceived by the interviewees. They 
also observed that the public has moderated the expression of its grievances, 
conforming to legality and to what ’good demonstrations’ and the ’demonstration 
culture’ ought, from a police point of view, to be.
However, these transformations, particularly in relation to the 1970s, are 
perceived very differently by the high-ranking chiefs interviewed. They are 
much more reluctant to acknowledge that significant changes have taken place 
in police behaviour. In reality, however, as these high-ranking officers were 
members of this type of unit in the 1970s, their caution points to a need for self­
justification. They find it necessary to show that important changes have not 
occurred in the unit’s way of operating and that they themselves have not 
changed in the way they carry out their duties. By the same token, it must be 
pointed out that some officers who were in service during the earlier period did 
recognize that certain changes had taken place in police control of social protests 
after the death of Franco:
[In the second half of the 1970s] a certain disorientation developed. Unions and 
political parties were given authorization. And police principles underwent a 
transformation now that their main activity was to protect demonstrations. This period 
was a difficult one for the police (Interview No. 4)
According to other officers interviewed, a significant change occurred in 
1982 when the Socialist Party won the general election. A high-ranking officer
observed:
From 1982-3 a more important change took place. The provincial governors and the 
politicians told the brigades that they had to be more tolerant. So, for example, an 
unauthorized demonstration was then treated with great respect. During the UCD 
government, the law was interpreted more strictly. (Interview No. 5)
A further difference, relating to operational deployment and its criteria, 





























































































Their form of deployment was not always the same but it was very similar. It’s also 
true that demonstrations were broken up more than they are now. (...) It’s true that we, 
the police, have become increasingly permissive, and it’s also true that the groups are 
much less radical than before. The demonstration culture has entered into 
demonstrations more than before. We’ve all advanced, the police and the 
demonstrators. (Interview No. 9)
Before, the old reserve units stayed in their barracks and only left them when there 
was already a rumpus to sort out. (...) As the demonstration was developing there were 
police from that city there and when it began to get out of hand, the reserve were 
called out and acted forcefully. The technique they use now is preventive deployment. 
When the demonstration is developing, the police are already deployed and they 
control the situation by means of that preventive deployment (Interview No. 7)
A clear distinction is established between reactive and preventive forms 
of control over social protests. The handling of protests prior to 1985 
(approximately) is considered purely reactive, whereas since that time it has been 
mainly preventive. This assertion explicitly establishes a clear distinction 
between two very different police models: one belonging to an authoritarian 
regime whose only objective is the maintenance of public order and a preventive 
model which is gradually being introduced into all areas of police 
administration. This latter model denotes an appreciable change in attitude with 
respect to the past. Greater forcefulness is acknowledged in those police 
interventions where the reactive model prevailed.
Some interviewees, particularly those who served in these units during the 
1970s, establish a direct connection between their interventions, the relevant 
legislation and political power, and thus avoid making the security forces 
responsible. This form of argument continually cropped up in replies during the 
interviews.
The tactics employed by these units indicate to a large extent which model 
of police control a state has decided to apply. These tactics stamp relations 
between police and citizens with a very specific character, serving, in the 
Spanish case, as a reliable indicator of changes in police attitudes within the new 
socio-political context, as well as its adaptation to the European context. The 
following comments provide a clear example:
Nowadays containment is practised more than penetration. Ninety per cent of the 
interventions we carry out are a matter of waiting patiently, covering an area and 
saying ’you can’t go further than this.’ Then you see who can stand it longer (...) In 




























































































The policing of Social Protest in Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy
them out. But on this occasion we limited ourselves to being there and preventing 
them from blocking the road into Cadiz. And waiting, waiting for hours. (Interview 
No. 5)
Now, we are increasingly moving towards massive intervention (...) Increasingly, they 
try to send more police to this type of confrontation so as not to have to act with 
greater harshness. (Interview No. 4)
Total tolerance. Now we carry the idea in our heads that we’ve got to try to avoid a 
worse evil. There have even been times when we’ve known something illegal is going 
on in a demonstration. And we think about it and see that it’s better at that moment 
to ignore it, because intervening would mean a bigger problem which would then be 
more difficult to resolve. And so we tolerate it. (Interview No. 8)
The tactics employed are typical of a police force which tends to exercise 
a gentler control over social protests. The use of forceful and aggressive means 
has fallen into disuse. The foreign models which most appeal are those which 
display a more tolerant attitude towards citizens’ grievances. The police are 
aware that forceful methods may have counterproductive effects which would 
be difficult to predict.
There have also been appreciable changes in the actual methods used, 
judging from the remarks of police officers:
The baton is what is most used because, in the long run, it causes less harm. The first 
thing we do is carry out a full-scale police deployment to try to dissuade people. 
Firing rubber bullets is very problematical because they are not weapons with a precise 
aim. Tear gas is problematical because it can cause serious injury. You don’t know 
whether some person has a respiratory condition. That’s why we try not to use it. 
What we use most is police presence, massive deployment and, as a last resort, the 
baton; in other words, hand-to-hand fighting. (Interview No. 8)
Water cannons. People associate them with South American dictatorships - Chile, for 
example. And here we say, if I use the watergun they’re going to bracket me with 
those regimes, ...perhaps that’s why we don’t use them. (Interview No. 9)
Horses are the last resort. They haven’t been used in recent years because it’s a risky 
business. In Spain, the cavalry hasn’t been used, and using it now would attract a lot 
of attention. (Interview No. 5)
Those elements which are most associated with the past have been 
relegated to the shelves of history as far as possible and are only employed when 





























































































aggressive and violent image in the public mind, for which reason utilization is 
eschewed. The advantage of batons is that they are inexpensive, their use can 
be easily controlled and the consequences are predictable. Although there may 
be a general feeling within the public that the use of batons can lead to bloody 
scenes, the advantages easily outweigh the drawbacks. In general, techniques 
considered to be most harsh or shocking for the public tend to be used less. This 
tendency is also clearly evident in the case of Italy.36
B. Perceptions of the Opponent
The police force as an institution dedicated to the defence of the state’s interests 
and to the peaceful coexistence of its citizenry develops a perception of the 
environment which is conditioned by the functions it carries out and by its own 
experience. Analysis of this perception is of special interest in the case of Spain. 
It will allow us to gain an understanding of the extent to which the perception 
of the opponent has evolved from the repressive 1970s to the present day when 
an attempt is being made to emphasize the predominantly social function of the 
security forces. Most of the interviews highlight the problems these units have 
had to face in the Basque Country37 38and in labour conflicts. A medium-ranking 
officer explained the situation, without much enthusiasm:
You’re in Cadiz and there are HB3! people there, and now here in Madrid there’s 
been a demonstration of conscientious objectors and there were advisors there who 
were pals of Jarrai39 (...) The violent methods they use are the same: you find a 
device in Gijon, and you see the same one in Cadiz two months later. A Molotov 
cocktail is made with the same technique; a set of spikes for puncturing the tyres of 
police vehicles: you find one in Galicia and then another in Sagunto [Valencia 
County]. There is a connection there. (Interview No. 3)
36 Ibid.
37 The police riot squads are no longer deployed in the Basque Country, having been 
replaced by the mobile brigades of the autonomous Basque police (Ertzantza). However, they 
still operate in Navarre, where the radical Basque collective is also strongly represented.
38 A legalized political organization considered to be the political arm of ETA.




























































































The policing of Social Protest in Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy
There is an idea, as the officer’s remarks illustrate, of a sort of ’Spanish 
International’, with Basque groups helping the most troublesome sectors to 
oppose the state.
Differences are also established within the police perception between 
’good’ and ’bad’ demonstrators, as may be observed in the following:
Workers’ conflicts are the same as they were 100 years ago, with the same tactics, the 
same organization, the same problems. They are peaceful people, normal run of the 
mill people who, at a given moment, get angry, organize themselves, use the methods 
they can, which are always the same (...) They become very radical. Someone who 
they’re going to kick out onto the street has lost everything and refuses to accept it, 
and it’s logical that he refuses to accept it. For us, these are the cases we most dislike, 
because often you see these people’s situation and you say, hell... what are these men 
supposed to uo if all they’ve got left is the right to protest. But, well, it’s got to be 
done, and we do it. But they’re the most disagreeable cases, and they’re the people 
who become most radical. (Interview No. 9)
The ’good’ demonstrators are those who protest about labour-related 
matters. Great sympathy is shown towards them, despite the harshness of the 
confrontations. Grievances of a politico-nationalist nature, however, are decried, 
as clearly expressed by a medium-ranking officer:
Normally, someone who demonstrates ... unless it’s a
question of ideologies, as in the case of the Jarrai lot, because they, well, they’re not 
right about anything. But normally someone who demonstrates does so for strong 
reasons. (Interview No. B)
This statement, which reveals a latent attitude, points to a clearly political 
element in the police evaluation of demonstrators as they deny the validity of 
collective grievances of a political nature or on the part of Basque radicals with 
whom they have traditionally had very harsh confrontations. This tendency 
shows a net contrast with other European cases, such as that of Italy where 
political protests are considered as ’positive’ especially in relation to ’non- 
political’ protests since the latter usually involve violent behaviour.40 
Nevertheless, in both Spain and Italy protests are more readily legitimized by the 
police when the demonstrators make claims about matters that directly affect 
them. In the case of Spain, this rule tends to hold regardless of the level of 
violence generated by the protest. While violent demonstrations motivated by 
specific grievances and with specific objectives - generally of a materialistic





























































































nature - are more likely to be tolerated, those of an ideological nature are most 
despised by the security forces. This is possibly due to the fact that in a context 
of economic crisis, materialistic grievances are more readily understood by the 
policeman-citizen and at the same time they are less disturbing and threatening 
to the status quo.
’Low intensity’ confrontations with other groups elicited fewer comments 
from the interviewees:
The problem with the students is that 90 per cent of them don’t know why they’re in 
the demonstration. There is a tremendous lack of information. Ninety per cent go 
because they know there’s going to be a lot of larking about. The thing is that students 
are young people who enjoy having a good time. (Interview No. 3)
The thing is that these groups are always the same, that is, the squatters are 
conscientious objectors and they are anarchists and they are anti-capitalists and they 
are ecologists and when we go to the demonstrations they are the same. All those 
groups are the same people. (Interview No. 7)
The students are discredited by the police on the grounds that most of the 
demonstrators do not know what the objective of their protest is. A generally 
deprecatory attitude towards opponents is expressed here since all the groups are 
considered to be almost always the same: fringe youth groups. At the same time, 
in some cases the police establish links between young groups and organizations 
with more subversive targets, as explicitly recognized in the following statement:
[Behind the squatters] there are well-constituted organizations. They are given 
respectability by lawyers who attempt to misrepresent the illicit activity and focus on 
the possible irregularity of police activity (...) They exploit every mistake we might 
have made in the inquiry in order to set the media at our throats. (Interview No. 9)
A conspiratorial environment is perceived by the police, which perhaps 
harks back to earlier times when any sign of opposition to the regime was seen 
as the fruit of a conspiracy. In any case, the enemy’s image is very clearly 
profiled.
In contrast to the assertion by some experts in the field that there is a 
natural tendency on the part of the police to display sympathetic attitudes 
towards ideologically right-wing positions,41 no clear tendency of this kind, nor
41 See Seymour Martin Lipset, ’Why Cops Hate Liberals and Vice Versa’, pp. 23-39, in 





























































































The policing of Social Protest in Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy
indeed of the opposite, came forth in these interviews. This was also confirmed 
in the Italian case.42
Thus, in the interviews with police officers, the way in which police 
perceptions have evolved in relation to their functions and to the surrounding 
social environment can be observed. Although a few perceptions survive in a 
partly altered form from earlier non-democratic times, it may clearly be seen that 
the preoccupations and tactics of these units do not greatly differ from those of 
neighbouring countries. It is also possible to conclude that there is an overt 
tendency to use methods and tactics appropriate to what might be called ’soft’ 
control of public order, characterized by the adoption of an attitude of tolerance, 
generally speaking, by these units during outbreaks of violence.43
Conclusion
As we have been able to observe, the Spanish transition during the second half 
of the 1970s was characterized by a process whereby significant political and 
social elements from Franco’s regime were combined with new forms of 
political organization. These latter were mainly demanded by an emergent 
political elite and by a society that had undergone a marked structural 
transformation throughout the preceding decades. This linking of the mentality, 
the forms of organization and interests of certain sectors of the former regime 
with new ideas about how the state and society should be reorganized brought 
with it, in many cases, new forms and hybrid structures. Depending on the 
particular circle in which this process of combination took place, the resulting 
new structures either inclined back towards the old forms or towards a break 
with them. In this sense, it may be seen that the administration was one of the 
areas that experienced a slower pace of transformation. Indeed, both its structure 
and personnel remained practically unchanged throughout the entire transition 
period. Within the administration itself, the armed forces, the judiciary and the 
security forces, in comparison with other institutions, underwent the least 
significant transformation. The police forces - independently of the pressure that 
the recently legitimized political forces were able or wished to bring to bear -
42 See Donatella della Porta, op. cit.
4j The characteristics of a ’soft’ form of control have been described by Olivier Fillieule 





























































































underwent minimal personnel changes.44 With regard to police mentality and 
particularly the structure of the forces, the transformations foreseen from the 
political Pactos de Moncloa (Moncloa Agreements) did not begin to take 
noticeable effect until well after the transition. When they came, it was largely 
as a consequence of the generational turnover which was progressively taking 
place during that period. Despite the evident differences between post-war Italy 
and the Spanish transition, clear parallels are evident in relation to the evolution 
of the security forces.45 The initial conditions as regards their assigned socio­
political role and the police ’ethos’ were significantly similar, largely as a 
consequence of the disadvantaged position of the progressive forces during the 
period of change.46
It should be underlined here that during the years of transition and 
democratic consolidation, the speed with which change occurred at the heart of 
the political organization varied significantly from one context to another. From 
what can be observed, we may deduce that those police sectors which were most 
closely linked with and committed to the former regime, those which were most 
impervious to external control (for example, the intelligence services), continued 
during the transition and following years to carry out taskss which did not fully 
correspond with the functions assigned to the police in a democratic regime, 
displaying attitudes and conducting activities which, in many cases, escaped 
political control.47
In other parts of the police forces, certain transformations, albeit at a slow 
pace of change, began to be observed in operations, as in the case of the police 
units assigned to the control of social protests. While it was not until the 1980s 
that such changes became noticeable and that they translated into a smaller 
number of victims in protests, it is true, judging by the officers’ statements, that
44 Particular changes affected only certain members of the security forces who had been 
especially and directly important in the repression of the emergent political elite.
45 Both in Spain and Italy the police were characterized by the militarization of their 
structures and the adoption of primarily surveillance functions. Officers came from the army, 
so they had only minimal experience in civil matters. The similarities between these two cases 
are surprising. See Herbert Reiter’s working paper in this serie.
46 In the Spanish case, from the beginning of the transition; in the Italian case, 
particularly from 1948 when the progressive parties were removed from government.
47 Again, significant parallels can be established between Spain during the transition 
period and Italy in the decades following the fall of the Mussolini regime. See Giuseppe de 




























































































The policing of Social Protest in Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy
members of these police units began to feel the changes during the first years 
of the transition. This change can only be explained within a three-tiered 
structural perspective. Firstly, as social protest began to be seen as a legitimate 
form of expression of dissatisfaction on the part of citizens in a democratic state, 
the political elites gradually shifted towards the adoption of a more permissive 
line in their regard. Politicians were not willing to accept the high political cost 
of disproportionate police interventions. In the second place, the modernization 
of police personnel and methods, together with a progressive demilitarization of 
their perception of the environment, led the security forces to moderate their 
interventions and the forcefulness of their conduct. Finally, the social 
demobilization advocated by the parties of ’the masses’ and the subsequent 
victory of the Socialist Party in 1982 resulted in a diminution of the intensity of 
social protests. The election victory contributed to a moderation of demands on 
the part of broad sectors of workers. From the beginning of the 1980s, all of 
these factors undoubtedly worked together to favour an abatement in the 
virulence of confrontations. In turn, this development translated into a significant 
decline in injuries and particularly deaths, which became rare events from that 
time on.
Oscar JAIME-JIMENEZ 
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